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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 910118

v.
Priority No. 2

JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant James Douglas Tyler appeals his conviction of
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991).
ISSUE PRESENTED
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did defendant receive ineffective assistance of trial
counsel?

When appealed following trial court proceedings on

counsel ineffectiveness, this issue is a mixed one of law and
fact.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-98 (1984)

(review following habeas corpus proceeding); State v. Templin.
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (reviewing denial of motion for new
trial).

However, when raised for the first time on appeal, the

question of trial counsel ineffectiveness appears to be one of
law, requiring the appellate court to examine the record of the

original trial, and decide de novo whether counsel's conduct was
so deficient "that the trial cannot be relied upon as having
produced a just result."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

In either

event, defendant must affirmatively show both that trial
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that such
deficient performance was prejudicial. JEd. at 687; State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 & n.2 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
The text of other relevant constitutional, statutory, and rule
provisions relevant to this appeal will be contained in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted of aggravated arson, a first
degree felony, following a jury trial.

He moved for a new trial,

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial court

denied the motion without a hearing, and sentenced defendant to
five years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 94, 132-33).

On

appeal, defendant reasserts his claim that he was ineffectively
2

represented at trial, in violation of his constitutional right to
counsel•
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's fact recitation is in two parts.

The

evidence supporting the conviction is first presented, as
elicited in the trial of this case.

Because defense counsel

ineffectiveness is alleged on appeal, a separate recitation of
defense counsel efforts then follows.
The Fire
This case involves a fire in the apartment of
defendant's former wife, Katherine Tyler, on July 1, 1990 (R. 117
at 164; R. 116 at 11-12).

Mrs. Tyler testified that on that day,

defendant came to her apartment, drunk, and started a noisy
argument (R. 117 at 165). Mrs. Tyler attacked defendant with a
baseball bat; he retreated, telling Mrs. Tyler, "You'll pay, I'll
kill your dog, and I'll burn your house" (id.)*

Defendant then

announced that he was going to buy some beer, and that he would
be back (R. 117 at 166).
Taking her dog, Mrs. Tyler went to a neighbor's home
and called the police (id.).

Before police arrived, defendant

returned; Mrs. Tyler saw him walk down an alley toward the back
of her home (id. at 168).
Police officer Richard Walton first responded to Mrs.
Tyler's call, which had been reported to him as an "unwanted
guest situation" (id. at 91). He found Mrs. Tyler at the
neighbor's house, and she told him that defendant had left her

3

home, but then returned (id. at 94). Officer Walton therefore
accompanied Mrs. Tyler back to her home, to make sure that the
premises were secure (id. at 94, 169).
As Walton and Mrs. Tyler approached, defendant emerged
from the alley next to the home and began walking briskly away,
down the street (id,, at 94, 170). By radio, Walton ordered a
just-arrived backup officer to stop defendant (id.)*
then exclaimed that her home was on fire (id.).

Mrs. Tyler

Officer Walton

entered the home and discovered a blaze in the kitchen, burning
atop or around the refrigerator (ici. at 94-96).

He exited the

smokey home and radioed the fire department (id. at 96).
Meanwhile, the backup officer had apprehended
defendant, over some resistance (id., at 100, 106). Defendant
told the officers that he had just been "walking around in the
area," and had not been inside the home, but also said that he
lived there (jjd. at 101 J.1

He was carrying a work

identification tag belonging to Mrs. Tyler as well as a set of
keys to her home and car (id. at 97, 102, 171). Defendant
claimed the keys were his, but told the officers that he "didn't
know about the identification" (id. at 102). Mrs. Tyler stated
that she had left the identification tag in her home after
returning from work that day (id., at 171). The officers arrested
defendant (id. at 96).

*Mrs. Tyler testified at trial that defendant did not live
with her, and that he had not been invited to her home on the day
of the fire (R. 117 at 164-65).
4

Firefighters quickly extinguished the fire (id. at
109).

Within half an hour, a fire department investigator

arrived to examine the scene (.id. at 109, 113). The investigator
took at least seventeen photographs, and seized physical evidence
including a paint thinner can found near the back of the home
(id. at 114-15).

He determined that the fire had two points of

origin—behind and on top of the refrigerator (id. at 117, 14243).

He eliminated all possible accidental causes, such as

electrical problems, defective appliances, or pilot light-caused
explosions (id. at 118-19, 122-23, 126-27, 131).
The can of paint thinner was examined for fingerprints;
however, defendant's prints were not on the can (R. 117 at 12425).

The fire department investigator, however, believed that

some type of accelerant, poured at the base of and behind Mrs.
Tyler's refrigerator, had been used (id. at 127-29, 143). He was
unable to tell whether the seized paint thinner or some other
accelerant had been used, because the substance had been consumed
in the flames and diluted by firefighting efforts (id. at 13839).

Other "ordinary material" sitting atop the refrigerator had

been separately ignited to form the second point of the fire's
origin (id. at 130-31).

The investigator therefore concluded:

"My opinion of the fire is that it's intentionally set with two
points of origin by hand-held flame" (id., at 132, 143).
The Defense
Defendant was charged with aggravated arson (R. 6-7).
Nancy Bergeson of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
5

entered her appearance as defense counsel nine days after
defendant's arrest; she promptly served a discovery request upon
the prosecution (R. 14-16).

Several weeks later, however,

Bergeson withdrew, due to a conflict of interest between the
Legal Defender Association and defendant (R. 23-24).

That

conflict had arisen from an altercation between defendant and
another Legal Defender staff member (July 27, 1990 memorandum,
copied at Appendix B to Br. of Appellant; R. 115 at 6).
At his mid-August, 1990 preliminary hearing, defendant
was represented by new counsel, Kenneth Brown (R. 114). Mrs.
Tyler and the fire department investigator gave their accounts of
the fire and subsequent investigation (R. 114 at 4-10, 11-18).
Against counsel Brown's advice, defendant testified on his own
behalf (id., at 20). He denied that he had threatened to burn the
home (jLd. at 21-22).

Defendant said that he had bought some beer

after the fight with Mrs. Tyler, returned to and briefly entered
the home, then sat down in the back yard to drink the beer, when
the fire explosively erupted (id. at 23-24).

He claimed that the

fire had centered around two water heaters in the home (id. at
24-25).
The fire department investigator was then recalled to
rebut defendant's testimony (id. at 32). As he later testified
at trial, and referring to the photographs he had taken, the
investigator positively opined that the fire had not originated
at the water heaters (id. at 32-33; R. 117 at 122-123).
Accordingly, defendant was bound over for trial (R. 2).
6

After the preliminary hearing, defendant fired counsel
Brown (R. 93; R. 114 at 31; R. 115 at 6). A second replacement
counsel, Stephen McCaughey, was then appointed (R. 20-21).
McCaughey retained a defense investigator at government expense
(R. 31-34).

In order to assure a complete defense investigation,

he also secured a forty-day trial continuance (R. 118 at 8-9).
The defense investigator began his work in October 1990, three
and one-half months after the fire (R. 107). His billing
statements reflect that his investigation relied upon data
collected by police and the fire department investigator (R. 8788, 107; see also R. 118 at 4). Prior to trial, he met with
defense counsel McCaughey on at least five occasions, with
defendant himself at least once, and was present at trial (R. 8788, 107).
Trial took place on November 28 and 29, 1990, not quite
five months after the fire (R. 117 & 116). The evidence
supporting defendant's guilt, as already set forth, was produced
by the prosecution.

Through counsel McCaughey, defendant

attacked the credibility and reliability of that evidence. Mrs.
Tyler's faulty memory, reflected by her failure to recall how
long she and defendant had been divorced, was pointed out to the
jury (R. 117 at 174-75; R. 116 at 63). Her numerous police calls
to complain about defendant in the months preceding the fire were
revealed, suggesting a vindictive woman out to "frame" her exspouse (R. 117 at 176-80; R. 116 at 63). Discrepancies between
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Mrs. Tyler's account of the July 1 police call and the police
department's call record were noted (R. 116 at 7).
Additionally, the contradictory testimony of Mrs.
Tyler's neighbor about the events of July 1 was called to the
jury's attention.

Early in her testimony, the neighbor said she

did not remember any fight between Mrs. Tyler and defendant;
rather, she reported that Mrs. Tyler had been visiting with her
since returning from work (R. 117 at 156). She also reported
that Mrs. Tyler had used her telephone to report the fire,
contradicting testimony that Mrs. Tyler had merely called police
to complain about defendant's unwanted presence (R. 117 at 15758).

These discrepancies were pointed out in defense counsel's

closing argument (R. 116 at 61).
Unable to shake the fire department investigator's
opinion that the fire had been intentionally set, counsel
McCaughey acknowledged as much to the jury (R. 117 at 143; R. 116
at 58).

However, he assailed the police and prosecution's

failure to determine whose fingerprints were on the can of paint
thinner seized at the Tyler home, beyond determining that
defendant's prints were absent (R. 117 at 145, R. 116 at 64).
This, again, was used to suggest that Mrs. Tyler herself had set
the fire, consistent with the troubled, violent relationship she
had with defendant (R. 116 at 64-65).
Finally, defendant himself testified.

Contrary to what

the arresting officers said he had told them, he stated that he
had been in the Tyler home shortly before the fire, and after the
8

baseball bat fracas (R. 116 at 24). He testified that he smelled
paint thinner, and saw Mrs. Tyler's paint set in the kitchen (id.
at 24-25).

He said that he picked up some papers from the

kitchen table, along with Mrs. Tyler's work identification card,
which fell from the papers as defendant sat in the backyard just
before the fire erupted (id., at 26). This, again, seemingly
contradicted the officers' report that defendant told them he
"didn't know" how he came to be in possession of this item when
he was stopped leaving the area on foot.

He explained his rapid

retreat from the area as an effort to find a telephone to report
the fire (id. at 26-27).
In short, evidentiary inconsistencies and witness
credibility questions were clearly called to the jury's
attention.

After deliberating for nearly three and a half hours,

the jury resolved those questions against defendant, returning a
guilty verdict on the aggravated arson charge (R. 47, 50). This
appeal ensued, with defendant now claiming that counsel McCaughey
ineffectively handled his trial defense.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to establish that he was deficiently
and prejudicially represented by defense counsel.

He wholly

fails to show what standards of counsel performance apply to his
case, much less that counsel failed to meet those standards. He
then states that prejudice should be presumed, in clear
contradiction of controlling law.

9

Such minimal attempt that he

makes to demonstrate prejudice is weakly speculative, and falls
far short of showing an unreliable trial result*
ARGUMENT
Introduction
Defendant has correctly identified Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as establishing the two-part
legal test for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 687 (emphasis added).

Utah courts apply this same test.

See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185-86 & n.5 (Utah 1990).
And, as the emphasized Strickland language shows, defendant bears
the burden of establishing both elements of an ineffective
counsel claim.

Accord Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. A failure to

establish either element of an ineffective counsel claim, even if
the other is shown, defeats the claim.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d

116, 118-19 (Utah 1989).
Here, neither element of an ineffective counsel claim
has been proven.

Point One of this brief will show that

defendant has not established the "deficient performance"
element.

In Point Two, his failure to demonstrate prejudice

caused by any possible counsel error will be shown.
10

POINT ONE
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN DEFICIENT COUNSEL
PERFORMANCE.
To make out the "deficient performance" element of an
ineffective counsel claim, a "strong presumption" that counsel
performed in a professionally reasonable manner must be overcome.
Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Defendant has not overcome this presumption here.
The gist of defendant's claim seems to be that the
attorneys assigned to defend him performed "perfunctorily" and
too slowly (Br. of Appellant at 4-6, 8-9). This claim is
speculative and conclusory, and therefore fails.
A.

Defense Counsel Adequately Investigated the Fire.
Defendant argues that his first counsel, Nancy

Bergeson, inadequately investigated the fire, even though she
promptly made a discovery request to the prosecution, and also
had a Legal Defender Association investigator interview defendant
in jail (Br. of Appellant at 4-5). His admission of these facts
flatly contradicts his assertion that "Bergeson did nothing for
the appellant while more than a month passed and the 'scene' [of
the fire] cooled" (Br. of Appellant at 8).

He also fails to show

that Bergeson's investigatory efforts—or those of counsel who
followed her—were limited to these measures.
Apparently, defendant contends that adequate counsel
would have not only sought discovery from the prosecutor and
interviewed defendant, but would have also independently
investigated the crime scene.

He supports this contention with
11

no authority.

Having wholly failed to demonstrate the existence

of an "objective standard" requiring such independent
investigation, Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 186, defendant cannot hope to
demonstrate that Bergeson's conduct was deficient here.
Indeed, at least one authority, the American Bar
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice (1986 Supp.),
implicitly rejects the investigation standard that defendant
apparently espouses.2 ABA Standard 4-4.1 requires defense
attorneys to explore "all avenues" leading to relevant facts.
However, the standard and its associated commentary emphasize
discovery from prosecutors and law enforcement agencies;
immediate "scene of the crime" investigation is not mentioned.
Counsel Bergeson therefore performed within applicable
professional standards when she sought discovery of information
in the prosecution's hands.
Defendant alleges that counsel Brown, who assumed the
case after Bergeson withdrew, also failed to investigate the fire
(Br. of Appellant at 8). There is, first, nothing in the record
on appeal to show what Brown did or did not investigate.
Presumably, Brown had access to the information gleaned from
Bergeson's efforts; defendant mcikes no showing that Brown failed
to obtain and review that information in a professionally
acceptable manner.

2

The ABA Standards are identified as an available "guide" to
assessing counsel performance in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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Defendant's argument that counsel McCaughey's
investigatory efforts were "too little, too late, [and]
ineffective" (Br. of Appellant at 9) also fails. McCaughey
entered the case over two months after the fire (R. 20-21), after
two prior attorneys had withdrawn.

It is absolutely astonishing

to suggest that his entry into the case under these
circumstances, clearly beyond his control, was deficiently tardy.
Further, McCaughey did investigate the fire, retaining an
independent investigator who examined the best available
evidence:

that collected by the fire department investigator.

He spent fifty-one hours on the job, including trial time, during
which he presumably assisted McCaughey in defense examinations
(R. 87-88, 107).
Defendant's complaint that none of his defense
attorneys arranged a direct investigation of the fire scene also
rests on the dubious premise that they could have gained access
to it.

Mrs. Tyler's private dwelling was burned.

Once the fire

was extinguished and investigated by the appropriate public
officials, Mrs. Tyler had no obligation to allow anybody else
into the dwelling.

To the contrary, she had every right to

repair the damage and proceed with her life (R. 117 at 191), free
from both warrantless official intrusions and unwelcome private
visitors.

Defense counsel, having no right to enter Mrs. Tyler's

home, can hardly be condemned for failing to inspect it.
Thus no showing of a deficient defense investigation of
the fire has been made.

Defendant's account of the investigation
13

is speculative at best, and does not overcome the presumption
that counsel performed in a professionally reasonable manner.
B.

Counsel's Efforts Were Otherwise Reasonable.
In somewhat scattergun fashion, defendant identifies

other examples of what he claims represent deficient counsel
performance.

These arguments also miss their mark, and do not

rebut the presumption of reasonable performance.
Defendant complains that "[n]o one interviewed
witnesses while the events [surrounding the fire] were still
fresh" (Br. of Appellant at 9).
that this is true.

The record contains no evidence

However, the non-record memorandum contained

at Appendix B to defendant's brief on appeal indicates that he
was interviewed for counsel Bergeson by a Legal Defender
Association investigator.3

This suggests that Bergeson may have

arranged to interview other witnesses as well.

However, the

interview with defendant also prompted Bergeson to withdraw from
the case:

the memorandum's post-script indicates that the Legal

Defender Association was adverse to defendant in another criminal
matter.

If that were so, it would make sense for Bergeson to

cancel plans to interview other witnesses, and leave that task to
replacement counsel.
Defendant similarly provides no record evidence that
subsequent counsel, Brown and McCaughey, failed to interview
3

Normally, the State would ask this Court to disregard such
non-record material. See State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah
1986). Here, however, the State waives objection to consideration
of this memorandum, believing that it actually advances the State's
position on appeal.
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witnesses.

They, of course, may have obtained witness interview

notes from their predecessor(s), making further interviews
unnecessary or even inadvisable.

And the record reflects that

the prosecution complied with defense discovery requests to the
extent required by law.

This compliance included provision of

police reports (R. 17. 30), which may have included witness
statements.

From those reports, counsel could have decided which

witnesses needed to be interviewed, and to what extent.

As a

matter of "sound strategy," Templin, 805 P.2d at 186, counsel
might have decided to not interview certain witnesses until
trial, to avoid preparing them for impeachment efforts.

See also

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (information from defendant may
eliminate need for further investigation). This could be
especially true with respect to Mrs. Tyler, given her
longstanding hostility toward defendant.
The State is, of course, speculating about what defense
counsel may have done with respect to witness interviews.
However, regardless of what counsel did or did not do, the strong
presumption, again, is that counsel performed reasonably.
Defendant's naked assertion that witnesses were not interviewed,
and his failure to show that possible decisions to not interview
all witnesses fell outside standards of reasonable counsel
conduct, do not overcome this presumption.
Defendant also alleges that counsel Brown, who
represented him at the preliminary hearing, did not speak to him
before the hearing, and was "ill-prepared" for it (Br. of
15

Appellant at 5, 11). This allegation is supported only by a
letter from defendant to the trial judge, after the preliminary
hearing, which resulted in the bindover order (R. 93). It is
therefore colored by defendant's disappointment that the
preliminary hearing did not go well for him.

That setback,

however, was arguably due in part to defendant's election to
testify on his own behalf, against Brown's advice (R. 114 at 20).
Defendant complains that police dispatch tapes,
recording Mrs. Tyler's July 1, 1990 call(s) for assistance, were
not timely obtained.

They were sought by counsel McCaughey;

however, because they are erased after three months, they were no
longer available when he sought them (R. 116 at 7).

These tapes,

defendant argues, would have clarified whether Mrs. Tyler merely
called in a domestic dispute complaint, or also reported the fire
(Br. of Appellant at 9). Perhaps so.

However, there is no

indication that any of defendant's attorneys knew, or should have
known, that the police would erase their dispatch tapes after
three months.

Seeking them four to five months later, then, was

not deficient performance; it was adequate performance, defeated
only by bad luck.
On appeal, defendant makes much of the "delays" in this
case (Br. of Appellant at 4-6). However, much delay is
attributable to defendant himself.

The Legal Defender memorandum

appended to his brief, and information in the record itself,
clearly reflect his lack of cooperation with counsel, and
impulsive firing of counsel when events did not proceed to his
16

liking (e.g., R. 75-83, R. 114 at 20, 31). This Court should be
extremely reluctant to find deficient counsel performance, where
the client effectively sabotages his or her own case.
Finally, defendant assails various "failures" to
adequately impeach prosecution witnesses at trial (Br. of
Appellant at 9-10).

He claims that certain prior "false"

complaints by Mrs. Tyler, apparently including another arson
complaint against defendant two months earlier, should have been
emphasized.

In fact, one or two earlier fires were brought to

the jury's attention (R. 117 at 178; R. 116 at 4).

This of

course was a risky tactic, for the jury was free to believe that
Mrs. Tyler's earlier complaints were not "false;" arguably, such
evidence of possible similar conduct by defendant should have
been excluded.

See Utah R. Evid. 402, 404(b), 608(b).

Further, the State is aware of no evidence that
"appellant was acquitted of previous false charges" brought by
Mrs. Tyler, information defendant says should have been presented
(Br. of Appellant at 10). Nor can the State locate any support
for the assertion that when apprehended leaving the scene,
"[a]ppellant had no trace of accelerant's [sic] about him" (id.).
The possibility that Mrs. Tyler "fabricated" certain
evidence, recovered by the fire investigator ten days after the
fire, was brought out and emphasized in closing argument (R. 117
at 192; R. 116 at 63-64).

Defendant's claim to the contrary is

false (Br. of Appellant at 10). Similarly, the failure to
identify whose fingerprints actually appeared on the can of paint
17

thinner seized by the fire investigator was also stressed (R. 116
at 64). In these ways, and in others already set forth in this
brief, the credibility and reliability of the State's evidence in
this case was diligently challenged by trial counsel McCaughey.
In sum, defendant's appellate attack on trial counsel's
performance does not merely fail to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness.

Alertly examined, it actually reveals that

counsel performed competently.

Accordingly, the "deficient

performance" element of an ineffective counsel claim is missing.
On this basis alone, the conviction can be affirmed.
POINT TWO
EVEN IF THERE WAS COUNSEL ERROR, SUCH ERROR
DID NOT RESULT IN PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT.
The "prejudice" element of an ineffective counsel claim
requires defendant to affirmatively show that but for the counsel
errors, there is a "reasonable probability" that the trial
outcome would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690,

693, 696; State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118-19 & n.2 (Utah 1989).
Defendant also fails to make this showing.
A.

The Burden is on Defendant to Show Prejudice.
Rather than demonstrate prejudice, defendant asserts

that "the prejudice prong of the Strickland test should be
presumed here."

He refers to "actual" and "constructive" denial

of counsel in an attempt to support this assertion (Br. of
Appellant at 8). That language appears to be gleaned from
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. However, read in context, the
Strickland reference to "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the
18

assistance of counsel," resulting in a presumption of prejudice,
clearly refers to instances where the prosecution "is directly
responsible" for the impairment of the right to counsel. Id.
In the same passage, Strickland expressly states that a
presumption of prejudicial counsel error exists in only two
instances:

(1) when, as above, the prosecution interferes with

the provision or functioning of defense counsel, and (2) when
defense counsel has a conflict of interest.

466 U.S. at 692.

Neither instance is alleged here, nor does the record suggest any
possibility of government impairment of defendant's rights.
Accordingly, even if some counsel error might be found here,
defendant must show that prejudice resulted.
B.

Defendant's Showing of Prejudice is
Speculative at Best, and Therefore Fails.
The prejudice, "reasonable probability" showing must do

more than show that possible counsel errors "had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding."

Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 693; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

This is

important here, for the cold record suggests that this may have
been a close case.

Conceivably, any number of factors might have

caused the jury to resolve this case differently.

Strickland and

Frame clearly teach, however, that this is not enough.
Further, both Strickland and State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182 (Utah 1990), show on their facts that prejudice should be
demonstrated through a showing of exactly what information would
have been provided to, or perhaps kept from, the factfinder but
for counsel's error.

In Strickland, specific, potentially
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helpful testimony not elicited by defense counsel was identified
to the reviewing court, 466 U.S. at 675-76.

Similarly, in

Tempiin, the potentially exculpatory testimony of an uncalled
defense witness was identified, 805 P.2d at 188.

Such a specific

showing is critical to demonstrating that counsel errors clearly
affected "the entire evidentiary picture," id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696), and were therefore prejudicial.
All defendant has done here, however, is to speculate
that he might have received a favorable verdict had counsel
performed differently.

This is inadequate.

See Frame, 723 P.2d

at 406 (failure to identify content of omitted evidence defeats
ineffective counsel claim).

In some instances, his speculation

is clearly unrealisticDefendant speculates that a defense investigation of
the actual fire scene might have helped him.

There is no showing

of what information such an investigation might have gleaned.

He

complains of a need for information relating to "[t]he burn
pattern, the point of origin, the presence or lack of
accellerants [sic], [and] the possibility of other sources or
causes of the fire . ..." (Br. of Appellant at 9). However, all
of this information was gathered and comprehensively assessed by
the fire department investigator (R. 114 at 11-17, 32-33; R. 117
at 111-35).
Defense counsel's investigator spent considerable time
analyzing the information collected by the fire department
investigator (R. 87-88, 107). Presumably, the defense
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investigator was competent (defendant makes no suggestion that he
was not). Surely, had the investigator found himself handicapped
by not having visited the scene while it was fresh, this would
have been brought to the jury's attention.

The fact that no such

argument was presented suggests that the defense investigator's
use of already-collected data was not a problem; it further
suggests that the defense could uncover no significant flaws in
the fire department investigator's work.

Defendant therefore has

made no clear showing that the lack of an immediate investigation
compromised the defense.
The complaint about inadequate witness interviews, even
if such deficiency were shown, similarly contains no glimmer of
prejudice.

Defendant seems to assign this "error" as largely

resulting in a failure to adequately impeach prosecution
witnesses (Br. of Appellant at 9-10).

However, he has not

identified any specific information that more witness interviews
might have provided.

He only speculates that State witnesses,

who were in fact strongly challenged, might have been more
effectively impeached.

It is equally reasonable to speculate

that further pre-trial interviews might have alerted those
witnesses about what to expect in cross-examination, making them
better prepared to rebuff it.
As to defendant's complaint that counsel Brown
inadequately represented him at the preliminary hearing (Br. of
Appellant at 11), any prejudice, again, is speculative.

In fact,

defendant himself, by testifying over Brown's advice to remain
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silent (R. 114 at 20), probably contributed to the probable cause
finding and bindover order that resulted from the hearing.
Certainly his credibility was seriously undermined by his claim
that the fire centered around the water heaters, followed by
rebuttal expert testimony that the heaters were undamaged (R. 114
at 30, 32). It also appears that any challenge to the
preliminary hearing is mooted by the trial verdict.

See State v.

Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n.6 (Utah 1991).
Finally, defendant complains that the police dispatch
tapes "would have clarified" whether Mrs. Tyler called police to
report the fire—thereby supporting the theory that she had set
it, or whether she merely called to report defendant's unwanted
presence (Br. of Appellant at 9).

Most likely, the tapes would

have clarified this question to his disadvantage.

It was shown

that police officers were dispatched to Mrs. Tyler's home at
10:09 p.m., half an hour after she placed her call (R. 116 at 7);
such a leisurely response seems unlikely for a fire call.

The

confirmed fire call was received at 10:15 p.m., after the police
officers were dispatched (R. 117 at 109). This is consistent
with Mrs. Tyler's and the officer's testimony that the initial
police call was placed only to report the domestic disturbance,
not to report a fire (R. 117 at 98, 167, 185, 188). As with his
other allegations of counsel error, defendant has shown no
prejudice from the failure to secure the dispatch tapes.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to establish either the "deficient
performance" element or the "resulting prejudice" element of an
ineffective counsel claim.

For these reasons, his conviction

should be affirmed.
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